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The Death of Graduation Prayer:















"I wish to complain about this parrot ..."
"Oh yes, the Norwegian Blue. What's wrong with it?"
"I'll tell you what's wrong with it - it's dead, that's
what's wrong with it."
"No, no, it's resting."
"Look, my lad, I know a dead parrot when I see one,
and I'm looking at one right now."
"No, it's resting. Remarkable bird, the Norwegian
Blue -beautiful plumage."
"The beautiful plumage doesn't enter into it. It's still
dead . . ."
"Look! There, it moved."
"He did not. That was you, pushing the cage. [Cleese
takes parrot out of cage, hits it on counter and drops it
on the floor]. Now that's what I call a dead parrot."
"No, no, it's stunned."
"Look my lad, I've had just about enough of this. That
parrot is definitely deceased . .."
"It's probably pining for the fjords. .... "
"It's not pining. It's passed on. This parrot is no more.
It has ceased to be. It's expired and gone to meet its
maker. This is a late parrot. It's a stiff. In the restive
night, it rests in peace .... It's drawn down the curtain
and joined the choir invisible. This is an ex-parrot." I
* Professor of Law and Hastings Faculty Fellow, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.
J.D, Duke Law School 1976. Prof. Tanford is President of the Indiana Civil Liberties Union, a
member of St. Paul's Catholic Church, and faculty advisor to the Christian Legal Society. He sees
nothing inconsistent in these three credentials, although some people might. Dan Conkle has been
of tremendous help, although he is not to blame for the ideas in this article.
1. "'he Parrot Sketch," from Monty Python's Flying Circus: Full Frontal Nudity (1969)
(videotape on file with author).
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A. Introduction
In 1992, the Supreme Court ruled, in Lee v. Weisman, 2 that it was unconsti-
tutional to "offer prayers as part of the official school graduation ceremony."
The Court held, as it has always held, that the Establishment Clause prohibits
religious activity at official school functions. Graduation prayer was dead.
However, in the two years since its demise, modem-day Michael Palins
stubbornly insist that prayer is only resting. If we just prop them up or give
them a slightly different look, graduation invocations will live in our schools
once again.
This article critically examines and responds to the remarkably persistent
argument by religionists that high school graduation prayer is somehow
constitutional despite Lee v. Weisman-not that it should be constitutional,
but that it is. 3 This position has been aggressively advanced by Pat Robert-
son's American Center for Law and Justice 4 and supported by several
recent law review articles. 5 To justify it, they read Weisman narrowly, 6
2. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
3. Several perfectly good theoretical arguments can be made that prayer at high school gradua-
tions should be constitutional. One could argue that the courts should recognize a broad free speech
right for student religious speech (see Bell v. Little Axe Indep. Sch. Dist., 766 F.2d 1391, 1400-02
(10th Cir. 1985)); predict that a conservative Supreme Court might in the near future abandon
existing Establishment Clause jurisprudence in favor of a new rule that permits religion in the
schools, a development suggested by Justice Scalia's dissent in Weisman; or suggest that the Constitu-
tion should be amended to permit school prayer. See Douglas Jehl, Clinton Reaches Out to G.O.P.
on School Prayer Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1994, at 1.
4. See undated "Bulletin" on high school graduation prayer distributed in February 1993, to
school boards throughout the United States by the American Center for Law and Justice (copy on
file with author).
5. Kevin E. Broyles, Establishment of Religion and High School Graduation Ceremonies: Lee
v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992), 16 HARv. J.L. & Pun. POLY 279 (1993); Dina F. El-Sayed,
What Is the Court Trying To Establish? An Analysis of Lee v. Weisman, 21 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q.
441 (1994); R. Collin Mangrun, Shall We Pray? Graduation Prayers and Establishment Paradigns,
26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1027 (1993); Robert Phillips, The Constitutionality of High School Gradua-
tion Prayers Under Harris v. School District No. 241, 8 B.Y.U. J. PuB. L. 491 (1994); Amy L.
Weinhaus, The Fate of Graduation Prayers in Public Schools After Lee v. Weisman, 71 WASH. U.
L.Q. 957 (1993).
6. See Weinhaus, supra note 5, at 957 ("Weisman answers the narrow question whether a
member of the clergy may deliver [a prayer] but leaves open the question whether other nondenomi-
national type prayers are proscribed"). See also Phillips, supra note 5, at 502-03 (claiming that the
Supreme Court, in Weisman, did not ban all graduation prayers but was narrowly focused on the
facts of the case and only banned clergy-led prayers). Whether the case is to be read narrowly or
broadly is open to dispute. At one point, Justice Kennedy suggests that the case is confined to
situations in which "State officials direct" the prayer, 112 S. Ct. at 2655, which would be more
narrow than the usual state action standard of significant official involvement. At other places,
however, Kennedy makes it reasonably clear that the Court is banning all prayer for which the
school is ultimately responsible under the traditional state action doctrine. Id. at 2660, 2661.
[Vol. 24, No. 3
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distort the Court's holding, " find ambiguity where none exists, 8 and act
as if Weisman were the only case addressing religious activity in public
schools. 9 They pretend that the court's "wall of separation" metaphor is
a recent invention' 0 or ignore it completely. "1 Religionists also tend to
ignore the Lemon test 12 and the "endorsement" doctrine '3-both of which
7. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 512 (suggesting that high school seniors might be allowed to
pray at graduation because "Weisman involved a middle school, not a high school"). In fact, Justice
Kennedy states the issue in the first paragraph of Weisman as follows: "School principals in the
public school system of the city of Providence, Rhode Island, are permitted to invite members of
the clergy to offer invocation and benediction prayers as part of the formal graduation ceremonies
for middle schools andfor high schools. The question before us is whether including clerical members
who offer prayers as part of the official school graduation ceremony is consistent with the Religion
Clauses .. ." 112 S. Ct. at 2652 (emphasis added).
8. See Broyles, supra note 5, at 285 (Weisman holding uncertain, "eulogy for school prayer
premature"); Phillips, supra note 5 at 509-10 ("Do student prayers count as a 'formal religious
exercise?" Would student invocations count if they were nonsectarian and non-proselyting? There
is no case law to support an argument either way.... [Alnalyzing whether prayer constitutes a
"formal religious exercise" creates... a quagmire"). No such ambiguity appears in Weisman, which
held without hesitation that prayer was a "formal religious exercise," even when nonsectarian and
non-proselyting. 112 S. Ct. at 2655 (calling it a "state-sponsored ... religious exercise"). See also
Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824 (11th Cir. 1989) (nonsectarian student invocation
given over the sound system at a school-sponsored football game violated the Establishment Clause).
9. See Phillips, supra note 5 at 502 ("Given the opportunity to ban all graduation prayers,
the court decline[d]. With this open door ... in mind, it is important to review what arguments
Weisman eliminated, since those not eliminated may still be valid"). Phillips writes as if a dozen
other Supreme Court cases banning religion in the schools did not exist and had not already rejected
many of those arguments.
10. See, e.g., Mark A. Boatman, In Search of a Defensible Test for Establishment of Religion,
37 ST. Louis U. L.J. 773, 773 (1993); Daniel Parish, Private Religious Displays in Public Fora, 61
U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 255 (1994); Andrew Rotstein, Good Faith? Religious-Secular Parallelism and
the Establishment Clause, 93 COLuM. L. REV. 1763, 1801 (1993) (all attributing wall of separation
principle to 1947 Everson case). In fact, it first appears in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
164 (1879).
11. The phrase does not appear anywhere in the Phillips article, supra note 5.
12. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 501 (Weisnan replaced the Lemon test with a "new Establish-
ment Clause test," the "coercion" test). To the contrary, despite vigorous argument by the Bush
administration in favor of a coercion test, the court rejected it, applying instead "the controlling
precedents," and stating explicitly "we do not accept the invitation of petitioner and amicus the
United States to reconsider our decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman." 112 S. Ct. at 2655. See also
Michael S. Paulsen, Lemon Is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795, 799 (1993) (suggesting that
Lemon has been replaced by a coercion test that would allow religion into the schools). Paulsen
has a degree from Yale Divinity School and is staff counsel for the Christian Legal Society's Center
for Law and Religious Freedom. See also E1-Sayed, supra note 5, at 465-66 (distorting secular-
purpose part of test to argue that religious activities pass constitutional muster if any secular purpose
can be found).
13. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 506 n.112 (refusing to discuss the endorsement test because
it "has never been accepted by a majority of the Court"). The claim is bizarre. In County of
Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989), Justice Blackmun, writing
for a majority of the Court, states that the endorsement test "has long had a place in our Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence," citing a half dozen cases.
Summer 19951
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appear frequently in the religion cases -and rely on Justice Scalia's "coer-
cion" test which has never been adopted by the Court but which would
tend to allow many religious activities in the schools. 4 They argue that
anything other than significant direct official action is beyond the reach
of the First Amendment, ignoring traditional state action doctrine that
also prohibits officials from facilitating religious activity. Is Religionists
promote a single aberrational case-Jones v. Clear Creek Independent
School District 16-that permitted graduation prayer, without analyzing
whether it is good law, and arguing somewhat paradoxically that this lower
court case should be read more broadly than Weisman. 17
This article will address each of the loopholes advocated by the religion-
ists-student-initiated prayer, prayer approved by a majority vote of the stu-
dent body, disclaimers by "neutral" school administrators, nonsectarian
prayer, voluntary prayer, using prayer for the secular purpose of solemnizing
graduation, or allowing prayer because it is a historical tradition. The article
concludes that the courts have clearly rejected each of these supposed loop-
holes. Graduation prayer is a dead issue, and no amount of denial will change
that fact.
B. The Courts Have Consistently Ruled That Religious Activity
at Official School Functions Violates the Establishment Clause
In interpreting the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court has never
once permitted prayer or religious activity at any official school function, no
matter what the guise, no matter whose idea it was, and no matter what the
14. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 507 ("the coercion test in Wetsman requires three prongs to
establish coercion: (1) the government directs (2) a formal religious exercise (3) in such a way as
to obligate the objector to participate"). Phillips cites Weisman at page 2656, although no such
language appears on that page. Similar language appears on page 2655, as a description of the
facts in the Providence case, but not as a legal standard for evaluating future cases.
15. See Mangrun, supra note 5, at 1049; Weinhaus, supra note 5, at 979-80; and Phillips,
supra note 6, at 508-09 (prayer permissible as long as school officials do not "direct" it). Compare
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594 ("The Establishment Clause, at the very least,
prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief') (emphasis
added) and Mangold v. Albert Gallatin Area Sch. Dist., 438 F.2d 1194 (3rd Cir. 1971) (prayers
given by students facilitated by school officials were still "clearly state action") with Paulsen, supra
note 12, at 799 (prayer unconstitutional only when school officials "compelled, induced, or strongly
encouraged attendance at a religious worship ceremony").
16. 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992).
17. See, e.g., E1-Sayed, supra note 5 at 468-70; Phillips, supra note 5, at 497; Mangrun, supra
note 5, at 1049-50. Jones is discussed in subsection F.4., infra.
[Vol. 24, No. 3
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"secular" explanation. In Engel v. Vitale 18 the Court ruled that nonsectarian
prayer in school classrooms was "wholly inconsistent with the Establishment
Clause." In School District of Abington Township v. Schemp, 19 the Court
ruled that it was a violation of the Establishment Clause for a teacher to read
Bible verses and for students to recite the Lord's Prayer. In Stone v. Gra-
ham, 20 the Court ruled that posting privately-funded copies of the Ten Com-
mandments on school walls was unconstitutional. In Wallace v. Jaffree, 1 the
Court held that voluntary nondenominational prayer in school was unconstitu-
tional even when brought in under the guise of a "moment of silence."
The federal circuit courts also have consistently ruled that religious activity
in public schools violates the Establishment Clause if it is approved, endorsed,
or facilitated by school officials. 22 The First Circuit prohibited prayer at
public school graduation in Weisman v. Lee, 13 the case underlying the Su-
preme Court's Lee v. Weisman decision. The Second Circuit held that the
Establishment Clause would be violated if a school authorized, supervised,
or took any action to facilitate student-initiated voluntary prayer. 24
The Third Circuit ruled in Marigold v. Albert Gallatin Area School Dis-
trict 21 that Bible readings and nondenominational group prayers were uncon-
stitutional. It rejected the argument that the prayers were the "voluntary
actions of students," pointing out that there was sufficient school involvement
to constitute state action. The same court also struck down a New Jersey
statute requiring a moment of silence at the beginning of each school day in
May v. Cooperman. 26 It found that the passage of the statute was religiously
motivated, was understood as such, and lacked a legitimate secular purpose.
The Fifth Circuit (en banc) unanimously ruled, in Meltzer v. Board of
Public Instruction, 27 that daily Bible reading and prayer in classrooms were
unconstitutional. In Hall v. Board of School Commissioners, 28 the court ruled
that it was equally unconstitutional to permit students to give the daily prayers,
18. 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).
19. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
20. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
21. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
22. There are apparently no cases on the subject of religion in the schools in the D.C. Circuit
or the Fourth Circuit, although the Fourth Circuit suggests in dictum in Smith v. Smith, 523 F.2d
121 (4th Cir. 1975), that it would strike down any religious activity taking place in the schools.
23. 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990), affd, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
24. Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 978-79 (2d Cir. 1980).
25. 438 F.2d 1194 (3d Cir. 1971).
26. 780 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1985).
27. 577 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1978).
28. 656 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981).
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even if they were nonsectarian "devotionals." The court also prohibited a
Bible literature class which was taught entirely from a fundamentalist Chris-
tian perspective, 29 struck down a school policy permitting student volunteers
to offer daily classroom prayers, 30 prohibited after-school voluntary religious
meetings that were supervised by teachers, 31 and enjoined a basketball coach
from sponsoring prayers before games and practices. 32
The Sixth Circuit prohibited graduation prayers in Stein v. Plainwell
Community Schools. "3 The Court ruled that even prayers given by student
volunteers and voted upon by the students violate the Establishment Clause.
The judges stated that such a prayer "says to some parents and students:
we do not recognize your religious beliefs, our beliefs are superior to
yours. "
The Seventh Circuit in two cases ruled that religious activity in the
public schools violates the Establishment Clause. In DeSpain v. DeKalb
County Community School District 428, - students in kindergarten were
asked to say in unison, "We thank you for the flowers so sweet, we thank
you for the food we eat, we thank you for the birds that sing, we thank
you for everything." The court ruled that this devotional violated the
Establishment Clause, even though it did not mention God. In Berger
v. Rensselaer Central School Corporation, 35 the court ruled that it was
unconstitutional for an elementary school to permit the Gideons to hand
out Bibles on school property, because such permission would create the
impression that the school was endorsing religion.
The Eighth Circuit struck down Bible classes offered in public schools
during regular school hours. Despite the fact that the classes were nonde-
nominational, voluntary, and taught by lay people rather than ministers,
the court held that they impermissibly advanced religion. 36 In another case,
the Eighth Circuit suggested that a band teacher's prayers before rehearsals
and concerts violated the Establishment Clause. 3
29. Id. at 1001-03.
30. Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897, 900-01 (5th Cir. 1981).
31. Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 669 F.2d 1038, 1044-45
(5th Cir. 1982).
32. Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 160, 164-65 (5th Cir. 1993).
33. 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987).
34. 384 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1967).
35. 982 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir. 1993).
36. Doe v. Human, 923 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1989), affirming 725 F.Supp. 1503 (W.D. Ark.
1989).
37. Steele v. Van Buren Pub. Sch. Dist., 845 F.2d 1492, 1494 (8th Cir. 1988).
[Vol. 24, No. 3
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The Ninth Circuit ruled, in Collins v. Chandler Unified School Dis-
trict, 38 that prayers and Bible readings at school assemblies were unconsti-
tutional even when they were student-led and attendance was voluntary.
In the course of the opinion, the court explicitly rejected the argument that
the students had a free speech right to lead such prayers. 39 In Grove v.
Mead School District No. 354, 40 the court stated that several other kinds
of religious activities are also prohibited in the public schools: daily read-
ings from the Bible, recitation of the Lord's Prayer, posting of the Ten
Commandments, and requiring students to participate in a religious cere-
mony as part of a class.
The Tenth Circuit ruled, in Lanner v. Wimmer, 41 that a released-time
program permitting students to attend religious classes held off school
grounds was unconstitutional if school officials facilitated or lent any ad-
ministrative support to it. The court stated broadly that the Establishment
Clause prohibits public schools from "engaging in [any] activities which
are essentially religious, religiously ceremonial, or worship-like, such as
the recitation of prayer or scripture, and the posting of the Ten Command-
ments on classroom walls." 41 In other cases, the Tenth Circuit approved
a school regulation prohibiting teachers from reading the Bible or making
Christian books available to students during silent reading periods, 43 and
struck down a school policy that permitted religious groups to meet on
school grounds during the day. "
The Eleventh Circuit ruled, in Jager v. Douglas County School District, 45
that an invocation given over the public address system before a high school
football game violated the Establishment Clause. The invocations had been
given for at least forty years by Christian ministers. The court noted that
these pre-game prayers were given at a school-owned stadium, over a sound
system controlled by the school, at a school-sponsored football game in which
the equipment and facilities were paid for by the taxpayers. The court rejected
the claim of secular tradition and held that the inescapable conclusion was
that the school endorsed the religious aspect of the invocation. In another
38. 644 F.2d 759, 761-63 (9th Cir. 1981).
39. Id. at 762-63.
40. 753 F.2d 1528, 1534 (9th Cir. 1985).
41. 662 F.2d 1349, 1358-59 (10th Cir. 1990).
42. Id. at 1354 (citations omitted).
43. Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990).
44. Bell v. Little Axe Indep. County Sch. Dist., 766 F.2d 1391, 1402-03 (10th Cir. 1985).
45. 862 F.2d 824 (11th Cir. 1989).
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case, the court prohibited a school from aiding and supervising student reli-
gious groups that met on school grounds" ' or permitting churches to use
school bulletin boards to announce their activities. 47
In fact, among all the more than one hundred federal appellate cases on
the application of the Establishment Clause to public schools" ' decided in the
last fifty years, only one permitted a religious exercise in connection with an
official school activity. 4 Every other appellate case o has declared religious
activity at official school functions unconstitutional.
The central reason for this uniformity of outcome is probably the principle
of "endorsement." The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence
requires that the government must be neutral on the very subject of religion.
It may not advance religion as opposed to nonreligion or support a generic
"civil religion." 5' It may not demonstrate a preference for Christianity (or
the so-called Judeo-Christian tradition) over other religions. 52 If, under all
the circumstances, it appears that the government is endorsing religion, the
Court has held that this endorsement, even if passive, constitutes unconstitu-
tional advancement of those beliefs.
In County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 5 3 the Supreme
Court summarized the endorsement issue as follows:
46. Nartowicz v. Clayton County Sch. Dist., 736 F.2d 646, 649 (11th Cir. 1984).
47. Id. at 649.
48. Cases indexed in U.S.C.A., 1st Amend. 98-119 (1987); id. 25-29 (1993 supp.); and under
the West key number Constitutional Law 84.5(3).
49. The case is, of course, Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992),
in which a defiant panel of the Fifth Circuit ruled that prayer at graduation was constitutional. The
case is discussed in part F.4., infra.
50. There are a number of district court cases in which individual judges, perhaps for personal
religious reasons, have refused to enjoin school-sponsored prayer. The essence of many of these
opinions is that the judge sees no harm (and perhaps some good) in a little religion in the schools.
Every such case that reaches the court of appeals has been reversed. Some cases have not been
appealed.
51. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450
(1971). Despite the general acceptance of this principle, the argument is occasionally made that
the Establishment Clause should be read as narrowly as only forbidding the creation of a state
church. This argument has always been rejected by the Supreme Court. Of the thirty-two Supreme
Court Justices who have participated in Establishment Clause cases, only Justice Rehnquist has
advanced the argument, supporting it with selected historical fragments taken out of context.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-105 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The leading treatise on
constitutional law dismisses the argument: "There is a seemingly irresistible impulse to appeal to
history when analyzing issues under the religion clauses. This tendency is unfortunate because there
is no clear history as to the meaning of the clauses." RONALD ROTUNDA & JOHN NOWAK. TRFATISE
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 21.2 (2d ed. 1992).
52. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
53. 492 U.S. 573, 592-94 (1989) (cross-citations omitted).
[Vol. 24, No. 3
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In recent years, we have paid particularly close attention to whether
the challenged governmental practice either has the purpose or effect of
"endorsing" religion, a concern that has long had a place in our Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence. Thus, in Wallace v. Jaffree, the Court held
unconstitutional Alabama's moment-of-silence statute because it was "en-
acted . . . for the sole purpose of expressing the State's endorsement of
prayer activities." The Court similarly invalidated Louisiana's "Creation-
ism Act" because it "endorses religion" in its purpose. And the educa-
tional program in School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, was held to
violate the Establishment Clause because of its "endorsement" effect.
Of course, the word "endorsement" is not self-defining. Rather, it derives
its meaning from other words that this Court has found useful over the
years in interpreting the Establishment Clause. Thus, it has been noted that
the prohibition against governmental endorsement of religion "preclude[s]
government from conveying or attempting to convey a message that reli-
gion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred." Moreover,
the term "endorsement" is closely linked to the term "promotion," and
this Court long since has held that government "may not . . . promote
one religion or religious theory against another or even against the militant
opposite."
Whether the key word is "endorsement," "favoritism," or "promo-
tion," the essential principle remains the same. The Establishment Clause,
at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position
on questions of religious belief or from "making adherence to a religion
relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community."
In Allegheny, the Court applied the endorsement test to a creche erected in
the county courthouse by the Catholic Church, and found that it violated the
Establishment Clause. The Court determined that the erection of a religious
display in the heart of government would inevitably be viewed as approving
or promoting that particular religion, regardless of who actually paid for it.
Lower courts also have widely used the idea of endorsement to analyze
Establishment Clause issues, especially in those cases where the religious
activity was privately initiated or funded. In American Jewish Congress v.
City of Chicago, 54 the Seventh Circuit ruled that a privately initiated nativity
scene on public property violated the Establishment Clause despite several
signs posted by the city denying that it endorsed the display. The Fourth
Circuit has ruled that a nativity scene erected on government property violated
54. 827 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1987).
Summer 1995]
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the Establishment Clause, even though it had been initiated and planned by
private citizens, because its location in front of a governmental building sug-
gested government endorsement. 5' The Second Circuit ruled, in Kaplan v.
City ofBurlington, 5 that a menorah erected by a Jewish group in a two-and-a-
half-acre public park adjacent to city hall violated the Establishment Clause.
Despite the fact that the park was a traditional public forum, the court decided
that because the menorah would be unattended and would remain in place
for several days, it would appear to a reasonable observer to have the approval
of the city. 57
Federal courts have found the endorsement principle useful in analyzing
the constitutionality of private religious activity in the public schools. In
Berger v. Rensselaer Central School Corp., 5 a private group initiated, paid
for, and conducted the distribution of Gideon Bibles in an elementary school
while school officials remained passive. School policy neither favored nor
opposed Bible distribution; if no private group had taken the initiative, no
distribution would have taken place. The Seventh Circuit rejected the argu-
ment that the Bible distribution was permissible under the Establishment
Clause. It ruled that because the event took place on school grounds, in the
presence of school officials, and with the acquiescence of teachers and other
school officials, it appeared to be an official school activity and thus consti-
tuted an implicit endorsement of religion.
It seems inescapable that prayer at an official school function such as
graduation, conducted on school property with school officials standing by,
will be viewed by members of the audience as an official endorsement of
religion. Indeed, one of the reasons religionists are fighting so hard for prayer
in the schools is just that: they want the schools to endorse religion and the
important values that it represents. But this very appearance of approval would
violate the Establishment Clause. The juxtaposition of a religious exercise
with a highly visible public event such as graduation is similar to a religious
display on the lawn of the courthouse. It does not matter who initiated it,
paid for it, planned it, or installed it. Time in a graduation program, like
space on a courthouse lawn, is scarce. The government both controls who
has access to it and is aware of its visibility. If a private group were to erect
55. Smith v. City of Albemarle, 895 F.2d 953 (4th Cir. 1990).
56. 891 F.2d 1024 (2nd Cir. 1989).
57. But see Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. City of Grand Rapids,
980 F.2d 1538 (6th Cir. 1992) (similar facts, different result).
58. 982 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir. 1993).
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on the courthouse grounds a pink statue of two gay men holding hands, the
city would immediately remove it, not put up small notices disclaiming support
for it. To leave the statue in place, the angry letters to the editor would say,
would be to condone the gay lifestyle. So too, when public school officials
permit a religious event to occur at a school event on school grounds, they
endorse the particular message.
C. Graduation Prayer Violates the Lemon Test
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 59 the Supreme Court announced what has become
the dominant framework for analyzing whether the Establishment Clause has
been violated. State action that advances, endorses or facilitates religion is
presumptively unconstitutional unless it can satisfy three criteria:
1) The action must have a clearly secular purpose;
2) Its primary effect must be secular, neither advancing nor inhibiting
specific religions or religion in general; and
3) The act must avoid excessive government entanglement with religion. 60
Despite some premature obituaries61 and Justice Scalia's vituperative attack, 62
the Lemon test has not been repudiated by the Supreme Court. Indeed, its
continuing vitality as one of several 6ways of analyzing church/state issues
has been reaffirmed twice by the Court in the last five years. In American
County ofAllegheny v. Civil Liberties Union, " the Court stated that Lemon 's
three-pronged analysis "has been applied regularly in the Court's later Estab-
lishment Clause cases." And in Lee v. Weisman, despite pressure from reli-
gious conservatives and the Bush administration, the Court decided "we do
not accept the invitation of petitioners and amicus the United States to recon-
sider our decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman." 65
The kind of graduation prayer involved in Lee v. Weisman, in which the
school planned the prayer, selected the clergyman, and gave the clergyman
guidelines to follow, clearly violated all three parts of the Lemon test. The
59. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
60. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK supra note 57, at § 21.3.
61. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 12.
62. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. At 2685 ("the interment of [Lemon] may be the
one happy byproduct of the Court's otherwise lamentable decision").
63. See County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 591 (1989)
(constitutional analyses under the Establishment Clause "are not susceptible to a single verbal
formulation"); Daniel 0. Conkle, Lemon Lives, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 865, 867, 874 (1993).
64. 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989).
65. 112 S. Ct. at 2655.
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religionists' argument that some kind of prayer should be on the graduation
program has therefore shifted to "student-initiated" prayer. Perhaps if stu-
dents decide whether to have group prayer, vote in favor of it, and select a
student volunteer to lead it, the Lemon test will permit it.
Student-initiated prayer may solve the "excessive entanglement" problem,
but it still runs afoul of the first two parts of the Lemon test: 1) The purpose
of prayer at graduation is still religious, not secular; and 2) the primary effect
is still to advance or endorse religion in general. The fact that prayer was
voted on by students does not change the fact that "the object is to produce
a prayer to be used in a formal religious exercise which students, for all
practical purposes, are obliged to attend." "The Weisman opinion held that
this constituted a religious purpose and religious effect that could not withstand
constitutional analysis.
D. The Establishment Clause Erects a Wall of Separation
Between Church and State
Under the rubric of the Lemon test and otherwise, the Supreme Court has
been consistent in its view that the central purpose of the Establishment Clause
is to ensure government neutrality in matters of religion. The Constitution
mandates that government remain secular rather than affiliate itself with reli-
gious beliefs or institutions. 67 The Establishment Clause prohibits both direct
support for particular religious beliefs and "subtle departures from neutral-
ity" 68 because its "first and most immediate purpose rest[s] on the belief
that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and
degrade religion." 69 The purpose of neutrality is not just to prevent govern-
ment from interfering with the free exercise of religious beliefs, but to guard
against the political tyranny and subversion of civil authority which might
result from the establishment of one dominant religion in a land of many
different faiths. 70 The purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects, including religion, from the vicissitudes of public controversy, to
place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them
as legal principles to be applied by the courts. 71
66. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2656.
67. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
68. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 449, 452 (1971).
69. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
70. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
71. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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In short, the Establishment Clause was intended to erect a wall of separation
between church and state. In Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Town-
ship, the Supreme Court stated: "The First Amendment has erected a wall
between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We
could not approve the slightest breach." 72 The Court has for more than one
hundred years consistently held fast to the concept of separation, first announc-
ing it in 1879 in Reynold v. United States, 73 and repeating it in numerous
cases since then. 74
In recent cases, the wall has been threatened but has not cracked. The last
eight Supreme Court religion cases have, remarkably, thirty-one different
opinions. This makes generalizations about "the Court's view" of the wall-of-
separation metaphor impossible. Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist and Scalia criti-
cize the metaphor when it is used to keep religion out of government 75but
rely on it when it is used to keep government out of religion. 76 Justices
Brennan, Marshall and Stevens have written opinions reaffirming the separa-
tion principle "and they were joined, in Lee v. Weisman, by Justices Blackmun
and O'Connor. 78 Justice Souter's opinion in Weisman takes a strong separa-
tionist position but does not explicitly refer to the wall metaphor. 79 Not one
of the three opinions in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District 8 or the
six opinions in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v.
Grumet mentions the wall at all. 8 With the addition of two avowed traditional-
ists, Justices Ginsberg and Breyer, there does not appear to be a majority of
the current Court willing to abandon the separationist principle.
72. 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
73. 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879) (citing Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptist Association that
the religion clauses built a wall of separation between church and state, and stating: "Coming as
this does from an acknowledged leader of the advocates of the measure, it may be accepted almost
as an authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the amendment").
74. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Larkin v.
Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 122 (1982); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 219 (1963). Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) ('the line of separation,
far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier").
75. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989) (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting). Justice White also joined Kennedy's opinion.
76. Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 43 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. at 637 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); id. at 651 n.7 (Stevens, J., concurring).
78. 112 S. Ct. at 2662, 2665 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 2670 ("the Establishment Clause forbids support for religion in general no less than
support for one religion or some."). Justice Souter expresses support for prior decisions invalidating
state actions that created a "symbolic union" of church and state. Id. at 2672.
80. 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
81. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
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E. There Are No Loopholes in the Wall of Separation
The Supreme Court has said that the wall of separation which keeps all
religious activity out of the public schools is absolute, complete, and unequiv-
ocal. 2 Separation is especially important in the public schools 3 because
"adolescents are often susceptible to pressure from their peers towards confor-
mity, and . . . the influence is strongest in matters of social convention." "
The nature of group prayer in a school setting leaves "the student [with] no
real alternative which would [allow him or] her to avoid the fact or appearance
of participation." 85 Therefore, the Court has frequently "observed [that] there
are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle
coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public schools" 8 where
"prayer exercises . . . carry a particular risk of indirect coercion .... What
to most believers may seem nothing more than a reasonable request that the
nonbeliever respect their religious practices, in a school context may appear
to the nonbeliever or dissenter to be an attempt to employ the machinery of
the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy." 8
Despite such clear and forceful language, religionists continue to argue
that there are, or should be, loopholes in the wall of separation. Thus far,
they have not been successful in the public school context.
1. There Is No Loophole Permitting "Student-Initiated" Prayer
Graduation prayer does not suddenly become constitutional because crowds
of students demand it. School officials who let the students decide can no
more wash their hands of responsibility for the result than could Pontius
Pilate relieve himself of the fate of Jesus when he put the question to the
crowd. 8 A student-initiated prayer simply replaces official pressure to partici-
pate in a religious exercise with peer pressure to so participate. 8 If the setting
is the same - the official graduation ceremony - this option has been foreclosed
82. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
83. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2658 ("The concern may not be limited to the context
of schools, but it is most pronounced there.").
84. Id. at 2659.
85. Id. at 2656.
86. Id. at 2658.
87. Id. (citation omitted).
88. Matthew 27:24 (New Revised Standard Version). It is ironic to hear the argument ad-
vanced in the name of Christianity.
89. Indeed, peer pressure may have an even greater tendency to compel conformity than
pressure from teachers. If the most popular kids in school advocate prayer, it may be almost
impossible for any student to resist.
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by the Supreme Court. In Lee v. Weisman the Court stated that "the govern-
ment may no more use social pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may use
more direct means." "
One part of the "let-the-students-decide" argument is that student-initiated
prayer would be private, not state, action. This is not a new argument;
religionists have urged in numerous cases that privately sponsored religious
activity in public schools should be allowed as long as the school does not
actively endorse it. The argument has been rejected in every federal circuit
that has decided the issue.
The Seventh Circuit faced the issue directly in Berger v. Rensselaer Central
School Corp. 91 A private group initiated and conducted the distribution of
Gideon Bibles in the classrooms of a public school, while school officials
stood by passively. Pat Robertson's American Center for Law and Justice
argued that this was private action beyond the reach of the Establishment
Clause. The Court rejected this argument, ruling that because the event took
place on school grounds, in the presence of school officials, and with the
acquiescence of teachers and school administrators, it was an official school
activity subject to Establishment Clause analysis.
Other circuits are in agreement. The Second Circuit has held that student-
initiated prayer violates the Establishment Clause and is not protected as free
exercise when it imposes on others. 9 Several circuits have ruled that privately
initiated nativity scenes on government property, erected under the eyes of
government officials, violate the Establishment Clause just as if they had
been planned by government officials. 93 The Ninth Circuit ruled that it was
unconstitutional to give students permission to conduct (or not conduct) pray-
ers of their own choosing at school assemblies. 9 The Tenth Circuit stated
that if students, parents, and the public might reasonably perceive privately
initiated religious activity to bear the imprimatur of the school, the activity
violates the Establishment Clause whether or not the school actually has
anything to do with it. 9 The Eleventh Circuit held that invocations at high
school football games organized by a private group (the county ministers
association) violated the Establishment Clause because of the appearance of
90. 112 S. Ct. at 2659.
91. 982 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir. 1993).
92. Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1965).
93. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Albemarle, 895 F.2d 953 (4th Cir. 1990).
94. Collins v. Chandler Unified Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 831 (11th Cir. 1989).
95. Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1057 (10th Cir. 1990).
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school endorsement. 96 Only the Fifth Circuit has been inconsistent, ruling
first that student-initiated prayer at official school functions violated the Estab-
lishment Clause, 97 then ruling that it did not, 98 and, most recently, ruling
that it does. "
The second part of the "let-the-students-decide" argument is the assertion
that school prayer is constitutional if a majority of students vote for it. The
Supreme Court has addressed the tension between majority vote and minority
rights many times and has never suggested there was a loophole allowing
prayer upon a majority vote by anyone. Indeed, the Court has always held
to the contrary. In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, '0 the
Court stated that "the concept of neutrality ...does not permit a State to
require a religious exercise even with the consent of the majority .... [I]t
has never meant that a majority could use the machinery of the State to
practice its beliefs." In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, "I
the Court stated that a person's rights to religious freedom "may not be
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no election." In Lee v.
Weisman, the Court reiterated this point: "While in some societies the wishes
of the majority might prevail, the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment is addressed to this contingency and rejects [it]. The Constitution forbids
the State to exact religious conformity from a student as the price of attending
her own graduation." 102
2. There Is No Loophole If School Officials Include
a Disclaimer in the Program
If school officials delegate graduation prayer to students, can the school
circumvent the 'implied endorsement" problem by including a disclaimer on
the program? The answer is unclear. In theory, private religious activity on
state property is beyond the reach of the Establishment Clause as long as
the government makes it clear-through disclaimers or otherwise-that the
96. Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 831 (11th Cir. 1989).
97. Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1981).
98. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992). Jones is discussed
in section F.4, infra.
99. Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 160, 166-67 (5th Cir. 1993) (implicitly
limiting student-initiated prayer to extracurricular activities, relying on Board of Educ. v. Mergens,
496 U.S. 226 (1990)).
100. 374 U.S. 203, 225-26 (1963).
101. 319 U.S. 624, 628 (1943).
102. 112 S. Ct. at 2660.
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government does not endorse the religious message. In practice, however,
the courts have rarely found disclaimers to be effective. In American Jewish
Congress v. City of Chicago, 103 the Seventh Circuit ruled that a privately
sponsored nativity scene on public property with six disclaimers still violated
the Establishment Clause. Neither did disclaimers save the constitutionality
of the privately financed creche in the courthouse in County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 104or of the copies of the Ten Commandments in schools in Stone v.
Graham. 105
Apparently the notion that a disclaimer in the graduation program might
be effective is derived from Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Lee v.
Weisman.
Another happy aspect of the case is that it is only a jurisprudential disaster
and not a practical one. Given the odd basis for the Court's decision,
invocations and benedictions will be able to be given at public-school
graduations next June, as they have for the past century and a half, so
long as school authorities make clear that anyone who abstains from
screaming in protest does not necessarily participate in the prayers. All
that is seemingly needed is an announcement, or perhaps a written inser-
tion at the beginning of the graduation program, to the effect that, while
all are asked to rise for the invocation and benediction, none is compelled
to join in them, nor will be assumed, by rising, to have done so. That
obvious fact recited, the graduates and their parents may proceed to thank
God, as Americans have always done, for the blessings He has generously
bestowed on them and on their country, .0
However, there are two problems with using this text as authority for a
disclaimer argument: It is not clear whether Justice Scalia was being serious
or sarcastic; and, in either event, his views were rejected by a majority of
the Supreme Court.
Disclaimers have been used successfully in only one context: when religious
symbols are included in a predominantly secular Christmas display. 107 The
idea would be difficult to extend to school prayer cases, because courts have
generally ruled that disclaimers are ineffective if any public official is involved
103. 827 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1987).
104. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
105. 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980).
106. 112 S. Ct. at 2685.
107. See Doe v. City of Clawson, 915 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1990); Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d
65 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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in the general organization of an event, 108 and only apply if the event occurs
in a public forum. 109 Public school officials -from the custodians who set up
the room, to the principal and teachers who sit on stage-are almost always
involved in graduation; and the typical graduation, where the number of
speakers is limited, is not a public forum.
Endorsement is a question of fact, not formality. The federal courts are
not as easily fooled as the religionists seem to think. High school prayer
cannot magically appear on the program without school officials encouraging,
facilitating, or participating in it. The school board may pass a resolution
leaving the prayer issue to the students. The principal may call an assembly
to let the students debate and vote on the issue. The senior class advisor may
help the student council organize a vote. The school may encourage the very
idea of a vote on whether to have prayer by printing, distributing, and counting
the ballots. The principal, superintendent, and members of the school board
may occupy the platform from which the prayer is given. In all such cases,
school officials are involved and are acting with unconstitutional religious
purpose. A formal disclaimer is unlikely to convince a judge that school
officials really had nothing to do with it, had no control over their rascally
students, and had no religious purpose in facilitating the vote. States have
tried these charades before; the Supreme Court has seen through them. 110
3. There Is No Loophole for "Voluntary" Religious Exercises
If the school makes prayer "voluntary" (participation not required), does
it become constitutional? Despite Justice Scalia's claim to the contrary, "I the
Supreme Court has clearly held that it does not. In Lee v. Weisman it was
stipulated that attendance at the graduation and participation in the prayer
were technically voluntary. The Court held that the reality was far different:
students were under tremendous social and peer pressure to conform. In other
words, the question of voluntariness and coercion, to the extent that it may
be relevant in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, 112 is one of fact. Announc-
108. Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
109. McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2nd Cir. 1984).
110. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (striking down equal-time-for-creationism
law); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (striking down moment of silence).
111. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2685 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (as long as students are told
it is voluntary, graduation prayer is permitted).
112. The claim has sometimes been made that a majority of Supreme Court Justices favor
the use of a "coercion" test in lieu of the Lemon test. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 12, at 797.
Petitioners and the Bush administration argued in their briefs in Lee v. Wesman that the Court
should replace Lemon with a "coercion" test that would permit voluntary prayer in schools as long
[Vol. 24, No. 3
HeinOnline  -- 24 J.L. & Educ. 435 1995
Graduation Prayer 441
ing that a prayer is voluntary does not make it voluntary in fact. In Weisman,
the Court has already decided that "voluntary" prayer in the high school
context is not really voluntary. This is consistent with earlier cases involving
"voluntary" religious activity in the public schools, in all of which the Court
has ruled that the challenged activity violated the Establishment Clause despite
its being putatively voluntary. '
This reality of the coercive effect of school-sponsored prayer has also been
recognized in the circuit courts. For example, the Seventh Circuit has stated
that it is unrealistic to expect a lone dissenting student to object to religious
activity in a public school classroom. "4 The Eleventh Circuit similarly re-
jected a claim that invocations at a high school athletic event were sufficiently
"voluntary" to escape Establishment Clause problems. I'
4. There Is No Loophole for Nonsectarian Prayer
The Supreme Court has never permitted prayer in the schools when it is
diluted and made nonsectarian. Indeed, the graduation prayer found constitu-
tionally offensive in Lee v. Weisman was nonsectarian. The majority of the
Supreme Court rejected Justice Scalia's assertion that a nonsectarian "civic"
religion exists in this country that is outside the prohibition in the Establish-
ment Clause. The Court observed: "The suggestion that the government may
establish an official or civic religion as a means of avoiding the establishment
of a religion with more specific creeds strikes us as a contradiction that
cannot be accepted." n16 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the
nondenominational character of a prayer does not remove it from strict Estab-
lishment Clause scrutiny. 117
5. There Is No Loophole If Prayer Is a School Tradition
Whether a school system has had a long tradition of graduation prayer is
irrelevant. Many school systems had long traditions of segregation, too. The
as no student was coerced into participating. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2681-82 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). However, the argument was rejected by the majority of Justices.
113. School Dist. Of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1963) (the fact
that individual students could absent themselves from religious exercises is no defense); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (making school religious exercises voluntary was no defense); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (the fact that prayer is voluntary is irrelevant and does not save
school prayer from violating Establishment Clause).
114. Berger v. Rensselaer Cent. Sch. Corp., 982 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir. 1993).
115. Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824 (11th Cir. 1989).
116. 112 S. Ct. at 2657.
117. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53 (1985).
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fact that a school has been unintentionally violating the Establishment Clause
for years does not give it the right to continue to do so. The "tradition"
argument was rejected by the Supreme Court in Lee v. Weisman. It has also
fared badly in the circuit courts. In Harris v. City of Zion, 118 the court
declared that the inclusion of religious symbols on the city seal violated the
Establishment Clause despite the fact that the seal was a historical tradition.
In Jager v. Douglas County School District, 1l9 invocations at football games
were defended on the basis that they were simply a tradition going back more
than fifty years. The argument was rejected out of hand.
6. There Is No Loophole Permitting Prayer for the Secular
Purpose of Solemnizing an Event
The courts have consistently held that school prayer may not be justified
by claims that it serves the secular purpose of solemnizing an event. In the
first place, judges are unlikely to believe assertions of secular purpose. In
Wallace v. Jaffree, 120 the Supreme Court held that a moment of silence for
meditation or prayer was clearly an endorsement of religion and served no
secular purpose, despite the state's assertions to the contrary. In Stone v.
Graham, M the school asserted that posting the Ten Commandments served
the secular purpose of expressing a universal set of values the school was
trying to teach. The Court was not impressed. It held that the Ten Command-
ments are undeniably religious, and "no recitation of secular purpose can
blind us to that fact." In American Civil Liberties Union of Georgia v. Rabun
County Chamber of Commerce, 122 the county asserted that erecting a large
cross on a hill served the secular purpose of attracting tourists. The Eleventh
Circuit rejected the argument.
Even if there is some secular purpose, religious activity may nevertheless
violate the Establishment Clause. The courts have held that the government
may not employ religious means to reach a secular goal unless secular means
are wholly unavailing. 123 For example, the Supreme Court held that a creche
may not be used for the secular purpose of acknowledging the Christmas
118. 927 F.2d 1401 (7th Cir. 1991).
119. 862 F.2d 824, 828 (11th Cir. 1989).
120. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
121. 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980).
122. 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983).
123. American Civil Liberties Union of Georgia v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce,
698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983).
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holiday because many nonreligious symbols are available (e.g., Christmas
trees, Santa Claus); but a menorah may be used to acknowledge Hanukkah
because no other symbol is available. 124 With respect to graduation, there are
numerous secular ways to solemnize it: the school band may play "Pomp
and Circumstance," the faculty may march in wearing academic robes, the
mayor may read a proclamation honoring graduating seniors, or the school
song may be sung. Because the school could accomplish its secular goal of
solemnization without prayer, the inclusion of prayer would be an unnecessary
endorsement of religion. 125
F. Other Arguments for Allowing Graduation Prayer Also Fail
In addition to arguing for loopholes in the wall of separation, religionists
have asserted other arguments in favor of graduation prayer-free speech
rights for the person who wants to give the prayer, free exercise rights for
students who want to hear it, the Marsh v. Chambers exception for a legislative
invocation -and have touted the lone aberrational case, Jones v. Clear Creek.
None of these arguments withstands scrutiny.
1. Free Speech for Students
Religionists often argue that a student "volunteer" has a Free Speech right
to present prayer at graduation. 126 There are a number of serious flaws to
this argument.
If the free speech argument is invoked on behalf of the students as a group,
it is problematic. Free Speech is predominantly an individual, not a collective,
right. The "students" as a group cannot claim a right to free speech when
some students disagree with the position of the majority. To do so is to force
dissenters to advocate a position with which they disagree. This violates the
free speech rights of the dissenters. The Supreme Court has addressed this
issue in the context of speech by labor unions. It held in two cases that the
124. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 613 n.68 (1989).
125. See Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 829-30 (11th Cir. 1989) (pre-game
invocation alleged to serve secular purpose of solemnization; school district could serve that purpose
with nonreligious inspirational speeches about sportsmanship and fair play, so prayer could not be
used).
126. See undated "Bulletin" on high school graduation prayer distributed in February 1993,
to school boards throughout the United States by American Center for Law and Justice (on file
with author).
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dissenters have the right to veto group expression. 117 The Court has similarly
held that a state bar association has no right to finance political or ideological
causes with which some members disagree. 128
A free speech claim on behalf of an individual student is also problematic.
The Court has not given high school students the same degree of freedom
that it has given adults. In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhimeier, 329 the
court upheld a school's decision to censor "inappropriate" student-written
articles in a school publication. The Court stated that the school, as a forum,
was different from the public park, and the students did not have broad free
speech rights. The school was acting within its power to control the school
newspaper, and had a duty to exercise that power in an educationally responsi-
ble manner. Similarly, in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser10 the
Court upheld the power of school officials to censor a lewd, sexually sugges-
tive student speech given as part of a school assembly.
The primary reason that students have only a limited right of free speech
is that a school is not a public forum. Public schools do not permit anyone
to wander in at any time and start addressing students on any topic. Indeed,
even when schools try to create a public forum, they rarely succeed. In
Berger v. Rensselaer Central School Corp., 131 an elementary school district
had a policy allowing the superintendent to permit outside groups to distrib-
ute literature during school hours. The superintendent admitted she would
not permit satanists to distribute literature, and Seventh Circuit held that
the school was not a public forum. The reasoning seems to extend easily
to graduation, which is also not a true public forum. School officials deter-
mine who may speak and do not permit any student who wants to grab
the microphone and talk about sex, drugs or other controversial topics.
Even if a high school graduation ceremony were a limited public forum
in which individual students had free speech rights, religious speech would
not necessarily be permitted. Some courts have held that religious speech
may be regulated if it would tend to dominate other kinds of speech and
turn a limited public forum into a religion program. In such cases, the
Establishment Clause and the Free Speech Clause conflict. When they
127. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline,
and S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
128. Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
129. 464 U.S. 260 (1988).
130. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
131. 982 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir. 1993).
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conflict, the courts have without exception given priority to the Establish-
ment Clause on the grounds that there are other avenues for exercising
free speech. 132
2. The Free Exercise Clause
The assertion is sometimes made that prohibiting prayer denies to Christian
teachers, families, or students their First Amendment right to the free exercise
of their religion. The argument is based on a misunderstanding of the scope
of the Free Exercise Clause.
When religionists ask to be allowed to "exercise" their religion through
public prayer at graduation, they are asking to engage in a religious activity.
The Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between religious activity and
religious belief. It has held that the Free Exercise Clause encompasses the
right to believe and to be left alone to engage in whatever private religious
worship one wishes. The state may not unnecessarily burden that right. How-
ever, the Court distinguishes belief from activity and gives the state power
to ban public religious activity when to do is necessary in furthering an
important state interest. 133 Since the ban on school-sponsored prayer is neces-
sary in furthering an important interest-the separation of religion and govern-
ment-and does not impose a significant burden on the exercise of religion,
the free exercise claim cannot succeed.
The free exercise argument fails for a second reason: mere failure to
support religion does not constitute suppression of it. Religionists argue that
if you're not for them, you're against them and thus deny that a neutral
position is possible. The law, however, requires that schools strive for just
such a neutral position, neither favoring nor disfavoring religion. -u This
principle of neutrality means that the school cannot permit one religious group
to practice its religion in the name of the school. It also means that although the
school cannot try to regulate private, nondisruptive religious activity occurring
outside the regular school activities, the religionists cannot ask that the school
"accommodate" religion by bringing it into the official part of the school
program.
132. See Berger v. Rensselaer Cent. Sch. Corp., 982 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir. 1993); Bender v.
Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984).
133. The leading free exercise cases are Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
(opinion written by Justice Scalia, usually one of the most vocal proponents of religion); and
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
134. See Board of Educ. of Westside Community Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990).
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Even if the mere absence of graduation prayer infringes to some degree
on the right of evangelical Christians to exercise their religion, 135 it is hard
to turn that into a legal argument that prayer should be allowed. Free exercise
rights in a public context must be balanced against the Establishment Clause's
mandate that public school officials maintain a wall of separation between
religion and school. If in order to maintain this wall school officials must
tell principals, teachers, teachers' aides, and student leaders that they may
not lead prayers at graduation, that raises (at best) the question of which
clause - Establishment or Free Exercise - should prevail. The courts have uni-
formly held that the restrictions of the Establishment Clause have priority
over a free exercise demand to engage in a religious practice, especially in
the school setting. 136 Any other rule would reduce the Establishment Clause
to an unenforceable exhortation. In Lee v. Weisman, for example, the Court
stated that "[tihe principle that government may accommodate the free exer-
cise of religion does not supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by
the Establishment Clause." 137
3. The Exception for Prayer by Legislative Bodies
In Marsh v. Chambers, 138 the Supreme Court permitted-the Nebraska legis-
lature to hire a chaplain to give opening prayers. It held that this particular
instance of state-sponsored religion did not violate the Establishment Clause.
Other courts have similarly permitted religious invocations at meetings of
legislative bodies, such as borough councils, county boards, and town meet-
ings.
The Marsh exception has not been extended beyond the legislative setting,
however. 139 Indeed, it would be particularly inappropriate to apply it to public
school graduations. At legislative meetings, no member of the audience is
135. This point is conceded. It is part of the dogma of many evangelical Christians that their
religion is a full-time matter, that actions such as proselytizing and praying are integral to belief,
and that education is a gift from God so that a graduation ceremony must acknowledge His role.
They would deny that it is possible to separate church and state, religion and education.
136. See Berger v. Rensselaer Cent. Sch. Corp., 982 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir. 1993) (the prohibition
against the establishment of religion is more important than the right of free exercise in the public
school context); May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 787 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir. 1986) (approv-
ing the prohibition against teachers gathering before school and praying; the teachers could practice
their religion elsewhere, and there was a danger that their conduct would violate the Establishment
Clause).
137. 112 S. Ct. at 2655.
138. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
139. See North Carolina Civil Liberties Union v. Constangy, 947 F.2d 1145 (4th Cir. 1991)
(judge opening court with prayer was unconstitutional).
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compelled be there, few children are present, and no one is subtly coerced
into participation. Attendance is truly voluntary, and there is no sanction for
refusing to participate.
In any event, the issue seems foreclosed by Lee v. Weisman, in which the
Court ruled explicitly that Marsh would not be extended to the public school
setting. Graduations differ from legislative sessions because of the youth-
fulness of the audience, the degree of control over the program exerted by
the school, the societal and peer pressure to attend and conform, and the
omnipresent power of school officials to punish miscreants and trouble-
makers. 40
4. Jones v. Clear Creek: The One Aberrational Case
Among all the federal appellate Establishment Clause cases, there is only
one-a Fifth Circuit case - that purports to allow prayer in the public schools
at an official occasion: Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District. 141
Despite all the legal precedent discussed in this Article, the Jones court
interpreted Lee v. Weisman as allowing student-sponsored, nonsectarian, non-
proselytizing prayer. Needless to say, this single case is heavily relied upon
by religionists as the linchpin of argument that student-initiated prayer should
be permitted at official graduation ceremonies.
Despite the hoopla, Jones cannot reasonably be considered good law. One
could make the argument that Jones represents what the law should be: a
retreat from strict separation and the beginning of a new First Amendment
jurisprudence that permits religion to play a broader role in the schools. But
the law is not yet there. As things currently stand, Jones is an aberration-
an opinion that appears to be deliberately trying to circumvent the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause cases. It contradicts language in Lee v. Weisman
and precedent from every other circuit. Subsequent Fifth Circuit cases have
ignored it in embarrassed silence. Jones is simply bad law.
Jones appears to be an attempt by a religious judge to circumvent Lee v.
Weisman, rather than interpret and apply it. The opinion opens by sounding
a pro-religion refrain, suggesting that religion in the schools is a good idea:
[P]ublic schools [have a] responsibility to develop pupils' character and
decisionmaking skills, a responsibility more important in a society suffer-
ing from parental failure. If religion be the foundation, or at least relevant
140. 112 S. Ct. at 2660.
141. 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992).
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to these functions [developing character] and to the education of the
young, as is widely believed, it follows that religious thought should not
be excluded as irrelevant to public education. 142
The opinion concludes with a section entitled, "From Sea to Shining Sea,
Great God Our King." 143 Along the way the judge expresses his view that
we, as Americans, are "subjugat[ed] to a deity." 144 The opinion of a federal
judge who believes religion is the foundation of education and that all Ameri-
cans are subjugated to God, who is our King, cannot be taken seriously as
a reasonable interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
Moreover, Jones distorts and misstates Lee v. Weisman, contradicts other
Supreme Court religion cases, makes assertions about Establishment Clause
doctrine that are either false or misleading, and confuses Establishment Clause
and Free Exercise Clause cases. The opinion begins by distorting the holding
in Lee v. Weisman, creating the appearance that Weisman is limited to the
narrow situation in which school officials directly and extensively control the
prayer:
The [Weisman] Court summarized its entire analysis of the constitutional-
ity of the school policy at issue in Lee as follows:
These dominant facts mark and control the confines of our decision:
State officials direct the performance of a formal religious exercise at
promotional and graduation ceremonies for secondary schools. Even
for those students who object to the religious exercise, their attendance
and participation in the state-sponsored religious activity are in a fair
and real sense obligatory.... 145
The Jones court selected this passage from the middle of the Weisman opinion,
not from the beginning or end where the Court usually summarizes the issue.
Indeed, when one turns to the first and last sections of Weisman, one finds
a broader statement of the issue that does not suggest this narrow "direct-
control" limitation:
142. Id. at 965.
143. Id. at 972.
144. Id. at 972 n. 13 ("the Pledge of Allegiance .... of course recounts our subjugation to a
deity").
145. Id. at 969-70. However, in context the Supreme Court's statement about "confining" its
opinion appears to be addressed to its refusal to reconsider Lemon, not to mean that Lee is itself
to be read narrowly: "These dominant facts mark and control the confines of our decision . . .
This case does not require us to revisit the difficult question [of Lemon]." Lee v. Weisman, 112
S. Ct. at 2655.
[Vol. 24, No. 3
HeinOnline  -- 24 J.L. & Educ. 443 1995
Graduation Prayer 449
The question before us is whether including clerical members who offer
prayers as part of the official school graduation ceremony is consistent
with the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. 1
The sole question presented is whether a religious exercise may be con-
ducted at a graduation ceremony in circumstances where, as we have
found, young graduates who object are induced to conform. 147
Next, after concluding that Weisman does not apply to student-voted gradu-
ation prayer, the Jones court bypasses all other Establishment Clause cases.
Instead, it "applies" Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v.
Mergens, 148 citing it for the principle that Christianity cannot be unfairly
excluded from schools. Mergens is an equal access case involving unofficial,
extracurricular religious activities at which only a handful of students and no
school officials were in attendance. It does not state an Establishment Clause
principle that religion must be accommodated. As the Weisman Court pointed
out, Mergens has nothing to do with an official school-wide activity, such as
graduation where "the State has in every practical sense compelled attendance
and participation in an explicit religious exercise." 49 The Weisman Court
said that the issues raised in Mergens, "often questions of accommodation
of religion, are not before us." ""
Jones then contradicts a number of specific statements in Weisman, simply
ignoring them and asserting that the opposite is true.
First, Jones asserts that a majority vote by students makes a difference.
The opinion states that a school "does not constitutionally endorse religion
if it submits the decision . . . to the majority vote of the senior class," 131
because "a majority of students can do what the State acting on its own cannot
do to incorporate prayer in public high school graduation ceremonies." 112 The
Supreme Court said otherwise:
While in some societies the wishes of the majority might prevail, the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment is addressed to this contin-
gency and rejects the balance urged upon us. The Constitution forbids
146. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2652 (first paragraph of opinion).
147. Id. at 2661 (final paragraph of opinion).
148. 496 U.S. 226 (1990). See Jones, 977 F.2d at 969.
149. 112 S. Ct. at 2661.
150. Id.
151. 977 F.2d at 969.
152. Id. at 972.
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the State to exact religious conformity from a student as the price of
attending her own high school graduation. .. . It is a tenet of the First
Amendment that the State cannot require one of its citizens to forfeit
his or her rights and benefits as the price of resisting conformance to
state-sponsored religious practice. To say that a student must remain apart
from the ceremony at the opening invocation and closing benediction is to
risk compelling conformity in an environment analogous to the classroom
setting, where we have said the risk of compulsion is especially high. "I'
Second, Jones asserts that the nonsectarian, nonproselytizing nature of the
prayer makes a difference. The opinion states that the "requirement that any
invocation be nonsectarian and nonproselytizing minimizes any such advance-
ment of religion." 154 The Supreme Court said otherwise:
We are asked to recognize the existence of a practice of nonsectarian
prayer, prayer within the embrace of what is known as the Judeo-Christian
tradition, prayer which is more acceptable than one which, for example,
makes explicit references to the God of Israel, or to Jesus Christ, or to
a patron saint. . . . [T]he First Amendment does not ... permit [it]. 155
That [a prayer] sought to be civic or nonsectarian rather than pertaining
to one sect does not lessen the offense or isolation to the objectors. '
Third, Jones says that age matters. It asserts that high school students are
mature enough not to be coerced: "We also consider the age of the graduating
seniors relevant to the determination of whether prayers [at graduation] can
coerce these young people into participating in a religious exercise ...
[G]raduating seniors 'are less impressionable than younger students.'" ,57 The
Supreme Court said otherwise:
[F]or the dissenter of high school age, who has a reasonable perception
that she is being forced by the State to pray in a manner her conscience
will not allow, the injury is no less real. There can be no doubt that for
many, if not most, of the students at the graduation, the act of standing
or remaining silent was an expression of participation in the Rabbi's
prayer .... We do not address whether that choice is acceptable if the
affected citizens are mature, but we think the State may not, consistent
with the Establishment Clause, place primary and secondary school chil-
dren in this position. '
153. 112 S. Ct. at 2660.
154. 977 F.2d at 969.
155. 112 S. Ct. at 2656.
156. Id. at 2659.
157. 977 F.2d at 971, citing Mergens, 496 U.S. at 235-37, a free exercise plurality opinion.
158. 112 S. Ct. at 2658-59.
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Fourth, Jones asserts that the school may enforce content restrictions on
prayer so that the prayer will not offend anyone. , The Supreme Court said
otherwise:
Principal Lee provided Rabbi Gutterman with a copy of the "Guidelines
for Civic Occasions," and advised him that his prayers should be nonsec-
tarian. Through these means the principal [unconstitutionally] directed
and controlled the content of the prayer. 160
The Jones opinion also contains a number of assertions that conflict with
other Supreme Court Establishment Clause cases. Jones asserts that graduation
prayer is permissible because it serves the secular purpose of solemnizing
graduation. 261 The Supreme Court has held to the contrary that a religious
symbol may generally not be used to solemnize an event if nonreligious
alternatives are available. For example, in County of Allegheny v. American
Civil Liberties Union, the Supreme Court stated that the availability or "un-
availability of secular alternatives is an obvious factor to be considered in
deciding whether the government's use of a religious symbol amounts to an
endorsement of religious faith." 261 It ruled that a creche could not be used
to commemorate the secular aspects of the Christmas season because other,
nonreligious, symbols (e.g., Santa Claus, Christmas trees) were available.
On the other hand, a menorah could be used to commemorate Hanukkah,
because no generally recognized secular symbol existed. 163
Jones states that the only way prayer unconstitutionally advances religion
is if it "attract[s] new believers or increas[es] the faith of the faithful." -
This bizarre definition of advancement bears little relation to the Supreme
Court's:
Our ... decisions... have refined the definition of governmental action
that unconstitutionally advances religion. In recent years, we have paid
particularly close attention to whether the challenged governmental prac-
tice either has the purpose or effect of "endorsing" religion, a concern
that has long had a place in our Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Thus,
[we] held unconstitutional Alabama's moment-of-silence statute because it
159. 977 F.2d at 971 (constitutionality of prayer is saved if a school "imposes two one-word
restrictions, 'nonsectarian and nonproselytizing.'").
160. 112 S. Ct. at 2656. The "Guidelines" advised that the prayer should be nonsectarian
and inclusive. Id. at 2652.
161. 977 F.2d at 966-67.
162. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 618 n.67 (1989).
163. Id. at 613 n.68.
164. 977 F.2d at 967.
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was "enacted. . . for the sole purpose of expressing the State's endorse-
ment of prayer activities." The Court similarly invalidated Louisiana's
"Creationism Act" because it "endorses religion" in its purpose ...
[T]he prohibition against governmental endorsement of religion pre-
clude[s] government from conveying or attempting to convey a message
that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred. More-
over, the term "endorsement" is closely linked to the term "promotion,"
and this Court long since has held that government "may not ... promote
one religion or religious theory against another or even against the militant
opposite." Whether the key word is "endorsement," "favoritism," or
"promotion," the essential principle remains the same. The Establishment
Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a
position on questions of religious belief or from "making adherence to
a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political
community." 165
Jones also states an unusually narrow definition of the endorsement test,
suggesting that only direct action, and not passive acquiescence, can constitute
endorsement: "[W]e understand government to unconstitutionally endorse
religion [only] when a reasonable person would view the challenged govern-
ment action as a disapproval of her contrary religious choices." '" The Su-
preme Court has given a broader definition. In Texas Monthly v. Bullock,
the Court stated:
The core notion animating the requirement that a statute . . . "neither
advances nor inhibits religion" is not only that government may not be
overtly hostile to religion but also that it may not place its prestige,
coercive authority, or resources behind a single religious faith or behind
religious belief in general, compelling nonadherents to support the prac-
tices or proselytizing of favored religious organizations and conveying
the message that those who do not contribute gladly are less than full
members of the community. 167
Similarly, in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, '" the
court held that a Roman Catholic creche was endorsed by the county govern-
ment merely by allowing it to be erected in the courthouse:
165. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 592-94 (1989)
(citations omitted). See also Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1982) (statute giving
churches the power to veto liquor licenses advanced religion).
166. 977 F.2d at 968, quoting afree exercise case, Board of Educ. of Westside Community
Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
167. 489 U.S. 1, 9 (1989).
168. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
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No viewer could reasonably think that [the creche] occupies this location
without the support and approval of the government. Thus, by permitting
the "display of the creche in this particular physical setting," the county
sends an unmistakable message that it supports and promotes the Christian
praise to God that is the creche's religious message. 169
Jones then suggests that unconstitutional state action takes place only when
the government "coerces" students to pray, and that this coercion occurs
only when "the government directs" a religious exercise. 170 It states that
only "government-mandated prayer at graduation places a constitutionally
impermissible amount of psychological pressure upon students to participate
in religious exercises." The implication is that student-initiated prayer, placed
on the graduation program with the acquiescence of school officials, does not
qualify as state action. 171 This is a far cry from the usual understanding of
the term. State action is not limited to situations involving direct, coercive
government action. The Supreme Court has found state action advancing
religion when the state did nothing affirmative, but merely allowed the Roman
Catholic church to erect a creche in a courthouse. 172 Such acquiescence could
hardly be termed "direct, coercive, government action."
Perhaps most tellingly, Judge Reavley's Jones opinion simply disagrees
with the mildly separationist sentiments expressed by the Supreme Court in
Weisman and other recent cases. He states that the majority of the community
has the right to set its own constitutional standards:
In Lee, the Court forbade schools from exacting participation in a religious
exercise as the price for attending what many consider to be one of life's
most important events. This case requires us to consider why so many
people attach importance to graduation ceremonies. If they only seek
government's recognition of student achievement, diplomas suffice. If
they only seek God's recognition, a privately-sponsored baccalaureate
will do. But to experience the community's recognition of student achieve-
ment, they must attend the public ceremony that other interested commu-
nity members also hold so dear. By attending graduation to experience
and participate in the community's display of support for the graduates,
people should not be surprised to find the event affected by community
standards. The Constitution requires nothing different.'"
169. Id. at 599-600 (citation omitted).
170. 977 F.2d at 970.
171. Id. at 971.
172. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
173. 977 F.2d at 972.
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To the contrary, the Constitution explicitly requires that states and school
officials protect the rights of those who want religion kept out of the hands
of government institutions -whether it is the school board or the student
council.
The Jones case thus stands completely outside the Supreme Court's Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence. Perhaps for that reason, it has not been ac-
cepted or followed outside the Fifth Circuit. In the most recent graduation
prayer case, Harris v. Joint School District No. 241,174 the judges stated they
were "not persuaded by the reasoning in Jones" 175 and found it "flawed." 176
Jones may not even be good law in its own circuit. In the spring of
1993, the Fifth Circuit decided a new religion-in-the-schools case, Doe v.
Duncanville Independent School District. 17 A student sued her public high
school over prayer at basketball games and practices. The district court en-
joined the school from permitting its employees to lead such prayers, or to
"encourage, promote, or participate in prayer with or among students [at]
school related events." 178 The Fifth Circuit upheld the order. In doing so, it
recognized only "two different lines of precedent: a restrictive one of consid-
erable parentage that prohibits prayer in the school . . . and a recently carved-
out exception permitting equal access to school facilities." '79 This equal ac-
cess exception, the court held, was limited to extracurricular student
groups. Mo The court ignored Jones. It neither cited it nor suggested that it
created a precedent for student-initiated prayer at official school functions.
Instead, the Fifth Circuit returned to traditional Establishment Clause cases
and declared that a "per se rule [exists] prohibiting public-school-related
. . expression" of religion. 18
F. Conclusion
The high school graduation prayer issue seems like it should be trivial. A
two-minute nonsectarian prayer is not inherently a meaningful religious exer-
cise. Indeed, the demand for watered-down public group prayer would seem
174. 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994).
175. Id. at 454.
176. Id. at 457.
177. 994 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1993).
178. Id. at 164.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 165.
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to contradict the basic religious tenets of the very group most stridently
demanding it-the evangelical Christians. Following the Sermon on the
Mount, Jesus taught:
Beware of practicing your piety before others in order to be seen by
them; for then you have no reward from your Father in heaven....
[W]henever you pray, do not be like the hypocrites; for they love to stand
and pray in the synagogues and at the street comers, so that they may
be seen by others. Truly I tell you, they have received their reward. But
whenever you pray, go into your room and shut the door and pray to
your Father who is in secret; and your Father who sees in secret will
reward you. 182
Despite its religious unimportance, the graduation prayer issue has become a
politically important battle in the latest round of Antidisestablishmentarianism
wars. 183
The assault on traditional Establishment Clause jurisprudence continues
apace. The Lemon test has been attacked. The wall of separation is under
siege. The calls for a new jurisprudence of accommodation and appeasement
of religious fundamentalists can be heard everywhere - even among a minority
of the Supreme Court. The religionist may yet win the battle but, as of today,
the wall holds. Graduation prayer is unconstitutional.
182. Matthew 6:1-6 (New Revised Standard Version). See also CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH 2696 (1994) ("The most appropriate places for prayer are personal or family oratories,
monasteries, places of pilgrimage, and above all the church, which is the proper place for liturgical
prayer for the parish community").
183. Ever since I was a child, I have promised myself I would one day use this word in a
sentence.
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